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We present an accreditation protocol for the outputs of noisy intermediate-scale quantum devices.
By testing entire circuits rather than individual gates, our accreditation protocol can provide an
upper-bound on the variation distance between noisy and noiseless probability distribution of the
outputs of the target circuit of interest. Our accreditation protocol requires implementation of quan-
tum circuits no larger than the target circuit, therefore it is practical in the near term and scalable
in the long term. Inspired by trap-based protocols for the verification of quantum computations,
our accreditation protocol assumes that noise in single-qubit gates is bounded (but potentially gate-
dependent) in diamond norm. We allow for arbitrary spatial and temporal correlations in the noise
affecting state preparation, measurements and two-qubit gates. We describe how to implement our
protocol on real-world devices, and we also present a novel cryptographic protocol (which we call
“mesothetic” protocol) inspired by our accreditation protocol.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum computers promise to expand our computing
capabilities beyond their current horizons. Several com-
mercial institutions [1–3] are taking steps towards build-
ing the first prototypes of quantum computers that can
outperform existing supercomputers in certain tasks [4–
9], the so-called “Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum”
(NISQ) computing devices [10]. As all their internal op-
erations such as state preparations, gates, and measure-
ments are by definition noisy, the outputs of computa-
tions implemented on NISQ devices are unreliable. It is
thus essential to devise protocols able to accredit these
outputs.
A commonly employed approach involves simulating
the quantum circuit whose output we wish to accredit,
the target circuit, on a classical computer. This is fea-
sible for small circuits, as well as for circuits composed
of Clifford gates [11] and few non-Clifford gates [12, 13].
Classical simulations have been performed for quantum
computations of up to 72 qubits, often exploiting sub-
tle insights into the nature of specific quantum circuits
involved [14, 15]. Though practical for the present, clas-
sical simulations of quantum circuits are not scalable.
Worthwhile quantum computations will not be efficiently
simulable on classical computers, hence we must seek for
alternative methods.
Another approach employed in experiments consists of
individually testing classes of gates present in the tar-
get circuit. This is typically undertaken using a family
of protocols centered around randomized benchmarking
and its extensions [16–21]. These protocols allow extrac-
tion of the fidelity of gates or cycles of gates and can
witness progresses towards fault-tolerant quantum com-
puting [22]. However they rely on assumptions that may
be invalid in experiments. In particular, they require the
noise to be Markovian and cannot account for temporal
correlations [23, 24]. Quantum circuits are more than
the sum of their gates, and the noise in the target circuit
may exhibit characteristics that cannot be captured by
benchmarking its individual gates independently.
This calls for protocols able to test circuits as a whole
rather than individual gates. Such protocols have been
devised inspired by Interactive Proof Systems [25]. In
these protocols (which we call “cryptographic protocols”)
the outputs of the target circuit are verified through an
interaction between a trusted verifier and an untrusted
prover (Figure 1a). The verifier is typically allowed to
possess a noiseless quantum device able to prepare [26–
33] or measure [34–38] single qubits, however recently
a protocol for a fully classical verifier was devised that
relies on the widely believed intractability of a computa-
tional problem for quantum computers [39]. Other pro-
tocols for classical verifiers have also been devised, but
they require interaction with multiple entangled and non-
communicating provers [40–44]. Cryptographic protocols
show that with minimal assumptions, verification of the
outputs of quantum computations of arbitrary size can
be done efficiently, in principle.
In practice, implementing cryptographic protocols in
experiments remains challenging, especially in the near
term. In experiments all the operations are noisy, as
in Figure 1b, and the verifier does not possess noiseless
quantum devices. Thus, the verifiability of protocols re-
quiring noiseless devices for the verifier is not guaranteed.
Moreover, the concept of scalability, which is of primary
interest in cryptographic protocols, is not equivalent to
that of practicality, which is essential for experiments.
For instance, suppose that the target circuit contains a
few hundred qubits and a few hundred gates. Crypto-
graphic protocols require implementing this circuit on a
large cluster state containing thousands of qubits and en-
tangling gates [26–31, 34] or on two spatially-separated
devices sharing thousands of copies of Bell states [40, 41];
or appending several teleportation gadgets to the target
circuit (one for each T -gate in the circuit and six for each
Hadamard gate) [33]; or building Feynman-Kitaev clock
states, which require entangling the system with an aux-
iliary qubit per gate in the target circuit [35, 39, 43].
These protocols are scalable, as they require a number of
additional qubits, gates and measurements growing lin-
early with the size of the target circuit, yet they remain
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2impractical for NISQ devices.
In this paper we present an accreditation protocol that
provides an upper-bound on the variation distance be-
tween noisy and noiseless probability distribution of the
outputs of a NISQ device, under the assumption that
N1: Noise in state preparation, entangling gates, and
measurements is an arbitrary Completely Positive
Trace Preserving (CPTP) map encompassing the
whole system and the environment (Equation 2) and
is unbounded in diamond norm;
N2: Noise in single-qubit gates is an arbitrary (poten-
tially gate-dependent) CPTP map encompassing the
whole system and the environment and is bounded
in diamond norm (Equation 14).
Inspired by cryptographic protocols [26–44], our accred-
itation protocol is trap-based, meaning that the target
circuit being accredited is implemented together with a
number v of classically simulable circuits (the “trap” cir-
cuits) able to detect all types of noise subject to con-
ditions N1 and N2 above. A single run of our proto-
col requires implementing the target circuit being ac-
credited and v trap circuits. It provides a binary out-
come in which the outputs of the target circuit are either
accepted as correct (with confidence increasing linearly
with v, cfr. Theorem 2) or rejected as potentially in-
correct. More usefully, consider running our protocol d
times, each time with the same target and v potentially
different trap circuits. Suppose that the output of the
target is accepted as correct by Nacc > 0 runs. With
confidence 1 − 2exp(−2dθ2), for each of these accepted
outputs our protocol ensures
1
2
∑
s
∣∣pnoiseless(s)− pnoisy(s)∣∣ ≤ ε
Nacc/d− θ , (1)
where θ ∈ (0, Nacc/d) is a tunable parameter that affects
both the confidence and the upper-bound, pnoiseless(s)
and pnoisy(s) are the noiseless and noisy probability dis-
tributions of the outputs {s} of the target circuit respec-
tively and ε ∝ 1/v. Bounds of this type can fruitfully
accredit the outputs of experimental quantum comput-
ers as well as underpin attempts at demonstrating and
verifying quantum supremacy in sampling experiments
[4–9].
Crucially, our accreditation protocol is both experi-
mentally practical and scalable: all circuits implemented
in our protocol are no wider (in the number of qubits)
or deeper (in the number of gates) than the circuit we
seek to accredit. This makes our protocol more read-
ily implementable on NISQ devices than cryptographic
protocols. Moreover, our protocol requires no noiseless
quantum device, and it only relies on the assumption
that the single-qubit gates suffer bounded (but poten-
tially non-local in space and time and gate-dependent)
noise—condition N2. This assumption is motivated by
the empirical observation that single-qubit gates are the
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Figure 1: (a) In cryptographic protocols a verifier A and
a prover B apply operations on their own registers and on a
shared register C. (b) In accreditation protocols all operations
applied to the system S are noisy. Noise couples the system
to an environment E.
most accurate operations in prominent quantum comput-
ing platforms such as trapped ions [45, 46] and supercon-
ducting qubits [2, 47, 48].
In addition to its ready implementability on NISQ de-
vices, our accreditation protocol can detect all types of
noise typically considered by techniques centered around
randomized benchmarking and its extensions [16–21].
Moreover it can detect noise that may be missed by those
techniques such as noise correlated in time. Mathemat-
ically, this amounts to allowing noisy operations to en-
compass both system and environment (Figure 1b) and
tracing out the environment only at the end of the pro-
tocol. This noise model is more general than the Marko-
vian noise model considered in protocols centered around
randomized benchmarking [23, 24]. Moreover, by testing
circuits rather than gates, our protocol ensures that all
possible noise (subject to condition N1 and N2) in state
preparation, measurement and gates is detected, even
noise that arises only when these components are put
together to form a circuit. On the contrary, benchmark-
ing isolated gates can sometimes yield over-estimates of
their fidelities [21], and consequently of the fidelity of the
resulting circuit. We note that noise of the type N2 ex-
cludes unbounded gate-dependent errors in single-qubit
gates such as systematic over- or under-rotations, as also
is the case for other works [16–21].
Inspired by our accreditation protocol we also present a
novel cryptographic protocol, which we call “mesothetic
verification protocol”. In the mesothetic protocol the
verifier implements the single-qubit gates in all circuits
while the prover undertakes all other operations. This
is distinct from prepare-and-send [26–33] or receive-and-
measure [34–38] cryptographic protocols in that the ver-
ifier intervenes during the actual implementation of the
circuits, and not before or after the circuits are imple-
mented.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 of Re-
3sults we introduce the notation, in Section 2 we provide
the necessary definitions, in Sections 3 and 4 we present
our protocol and prove our results and in Section 5 we
present the mesothetic verification protocol.
RESULTS
1. Notation: We indicate unitary matrices acting on
the system with capital letters such as U, V and W , and
Completely Positive Trace Preserving (CPTP) maps
with calligraphic letters such as E ,F ,R and M. We
indicate the 2 × 2 identity matrix as I, the single-qubit
Pauli gates as X,Y, Z, the controlled-Z gate as cZ, the
controlled-X gate as cX, the Hadamard gate as H and
S = diag(1, i). The symbol ◦ denotes the composition
of CPTP maps: ◦qp=1Ep(ρ) = Eq . . . E1(ρ), TrE [ · ] is
the trace over the environment, D(σ, τ) = Tr|σ − τ |/2
is the trace distance between the states σ and τ ,
|| · || is the diamond norm for super-operators [49].
A noisy implementation E˜ of E suffers bounded noise
if ||E − E˜ || < r for some 0 ≤ r < 1 and E˜ can be
written as E˜ = (1 − r)E + rF for some CPTP map F .
If ||E − E˜ || = 1 we say that the noise is unbounded.
2. Background: We start by defining our notion of
protocol:
Definition 1. [Protocol]. Consider a system S in the
state ρS. A protocol on input ρS is a collection of CPTP
maps {E (p)S }qp=1 acting on S and yielding the state ρout =
◦qp=1E (p)S (ρS).
When implemented on real devices protocols suffer the
effects of noise. Modeling noise as a set {F (p)SE} of CPTP
maps acting on system and environment (Figure 1b), the
state of the system at the end of a noisy protocol run is
ρout = TrE
[ ◦qp=1 F (p)SE(E (p)S ⊗ IE)(ρS ⊗ ρE)] , (2)
where ρE is the state of the environment at the begin-
ning of the protocol. We allow each map F (p)SE to depend
arbitrarily on the corresponding operation E (p)S .
A trap-based accreditation protocol is defined as fol-
lows. A single run of such a protocol takes as input a
classical description of the target circuit and a number
v, implements v+ 1 circuits (the target and v traps) and
returns the outputs of the target circuit, together with a
“flag bit” set to “acc” (“rej”) indicating that the output
of the target must be accepted (rejected). Formally,
Definition 2. [Accreditation Protocol]. Consider a
protocol {E (p)S }qp=1 with input ρS, where ρS contains a
classical description of the target circuit and the num-
ber v of trap circuits. Consider also a set of CPTP
maps {F (p)SE}qp=1 (the noise) acting on system and envi-
ronment. We say that the protocol {E (p)S }qp=1 can accredit
the outputs of the target circuit in the presence of noise
{F (p)SE}qp=1 if the following two properties hold:
1) The state of the system at the end of a single protocol
run (Equation 2) can be expressed as
ρout = b τ
′ tar
out ⊗ |acc〉〈acc| (3)
+ (1− b)
(
l σtarout ⊗ |acc〉〈acc|+ (1− l)τ tarout ⊗ |rej〉〈rej|
)
where σtarout (τ
′ tar
out ) is the state of the target circuit at
the end of a noiseless (noisy) protocol run, τ tarout is an
arbitrary state for the target circuit, |acc〉 is the state
of the flag indicating acceptance, |rej〉 = |acc⊕ 1〉, 0 ≤
l ≤ 1, 0 ≤ b ≤ ε and ε ∈ [0, 1].
2) After d protocol runs with the same target circuit and
v potentially different trap circuits, if all these runs
are affected by independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) noise, then the variation distance between
noisy and noiseless probability distribution of the out-
puts of each of the Nacc ∈ [0, d] protocol runs ending
with flag bit in the state |acc〉 is upper-bounded as in
Equation 1.
Property 1 ensures that the probability of accepting the
outputs of a single protocol run when the target circuit is
affected by noise (the number b in Equation 3) is smaller
than a constant ε. The constant ε is a function of the
number of trap circuits, of the protocol and of the noise
model and is to be computed analytically. The quan-
tity 1 − ε quantifies the credibility of the accreditation
protocol.
Note that Property 1 in the above definition implies
Property 2. To see this, assume Property 1 is valid for
a given protocol. Suppose that this protocol is run d
times with i.i.d. noise (a standard assumption in trap-
based cryptographic protocols [29, 36]) and suppose that
Nacc > 0 protocol runs end with flag bit in the state |acc〉.
For each of these Nacc runs, the state of the system at the
end of the protocol run is thus of the form (cfr. Equation
3)
ρout, acc =
(1− b)l σtarout + b τ ′ tarout
(1− b)l + b ⊗ |acc〉〈acc| (4)
This yields a bound on the variation distance of the type
[50]
1
2
∑
s
∣∣pnoiseless(s)− pnoisy(s)∣∣
≤ D
(
σtarout ,
(1− b)l σtarout + b τ ′ tarout
(1− b)l + b
)
≤ b
(1− b)l + b ≤
ε
prob(acc)
, (5)
where in the last inequality we used that b ≤ ε (Property
1) and that the quantity prob(acc)= (1 − b)l + b is the
4probability of accepting (Equation 3). Hoeffding’s In-
equality ensures that |prob(acc)−Nacc/d| ≤ θ with con-
fidence 1− 2exp(−2dθ2) and this yields Property 2.
Bounding the variation distance as in Equation 1 re-
quires knowledge of the two numbers ε and Nacc, the
former obtained theoretically from the protocol and the
latter experimentally from the device being tested. ε is
a property of the protocol, of its input and of the noise
model and can be computed without running the proto-
col. However, different devices running the same target
circuit will suffer different noise levels and this is captured
by Nacc, which depends on the experimental device be-
ing tested. It is important to note that the bound on the
variation distance is valid only for the outputs of the Nacc
protocol runs ending with flag bit in the state |acc〉. If a
protocol run ends with flag bit in the state |rej〉, Prop-
erty 1 implies no bound on the variation distance and all
rejected outputs must be discarded.
We can now present our accreditation protocol (a
formal description can be found in Box 1 in the Methods).
3. Our accreditation protocol: Our accreditation
protocol takes as input a classical description of the tar-
get circuit and the number v of trap circuits. The target
circuit (Figure 2) must start with qubits in the state |+〉,
contain only single-qubit gates and cZ gates and end with
a round of measurements in the Pauli-X basis1. More-
over, it must be decomposed as a sequence of bands, each
one containing one round of single-qubit gates and one
round of cZ gates. We will indicate the number of qubits
with n and the number of bands with m.
In our accreditation protocol v + 1 circuits are im-
plemented, one (chosen at random) being the target
and the remaining v being the traps. The trap circuits
are obtained by replacing the single-qubit gates in the
target circuit with other single-qubit gates, but input
state, measurements and cZ gates are the same as in the
target (Figure 3a; all single-qubit gates acting on the
same qubit in the same band must be recompiled into
one gate). These single-qubit gates are chosen as follows
(Routine 2, Box 3 in the Methods):
For each band j ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1} and for each qubit
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
• If qubit i is connected to another qubit i′ by a cZ gate, a
gate is chosen at random from the set {Hi⊗Si′ , Si⊗Hi′}
and is implemented on qubits i and i′ in band j. This
gate is then undone in band j + 1.
• Otherwise, if qubit i is not connected to any other
qubit by a cZ gate, a gate is chosen at random from the
set {Hi, Si} and is implemented on qubit i in band j.
1 This does not result in any loss of generality: every experi-
mental architecture has its native input states, entangling gates
and measurement basis, but these can always be mapped to |+〉
states, cZ gates and Pauli-X measurements.
i
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Figure 2: A six-qubit example of target circuit.
This gate is then undone in band j + 1.
Moreover, depending on the random bit t ∈ {0, 1}, the
traps may begin and end with a round of Hadamard
gates. Since (S ⊗H)cZ(S† ⊗H) = cX, the trap circuits
are a sequence of (randomly oriented) cX gates acting on
|+〉⊗n (if t = 0) or |0〉⊗n (if t = 1)—Figure 3b. In the
absence of noise, they always output s = 0.
Our protocol requires appending a Quantum One-
Time Pad (QOTP) to all single-qubit gates in all circuits
(target and traps). This is described in Routine 1 in the
Methods and is done as follows:
• For all bands j = 1, . . . ,m and qubits i = 1, . . . , n,
a random Pauli gate is appended after each gate Ui,j
(Figure 4a). This yields
U ′i,j = X
α′i,j
i Z
αi,j
i Ui,j , (6)
where αi,j , α
′
i,j ∈ {0, 1} are random bits.
• For all bands j = 2, . . . ,m and qubits i = 1, . . . , n,
another Pauli gate is appended before each single-qubit
gate. This Pauli gate is chosen so that it undoes the
QOTP coming from the previous band (Figure 4b).
Choosing this Pauli gate requires using the identities
(X1 ⊗ I2)cZ = cZ(X1 ⊗ Z2), (7)
(Z1 ⊗ I2)cZ = cZ(Z1 ⊗ I2). (8)
This yields
U ′′i,j = X
α′i,j
i Z
αi,j
i Ui,jPi
({αi,j−1}i, {α′i,j−1}i) , (9)
where Pi
({αi,j−1}i, {α′i,j−1}i) is a Pauli gate that
depends on the QOTP in the previous band.
• A random Pauli-X gate is appended before all the gates
U ′i,1 in the first band. This yields
U ′′i,1 = U
′
i,1X
γ′i
i (10)
with γi ∈ {0, 1} chosen at random.
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Figure 3: (a) Example of trap circuit for the target circuit in Figure 2 and (b) overall computation implemented through
this trap circuit. All the single-qubit gates acting on the same qubit in the same band must be recompiled into one gate—for
instance, in Figure 3a, the Ht-gate and subsequent S-gate acting on qubit 1 in band 1 must be implemented as one gate SHt.
U ′i,j
U ′i+1,j
U ′i,j+1
U ′i+1,j+1
Ui,j X Ui,j+1 Z
Ui+1,j XZ Ui+1,j+1 X
(a)
U ′′i,j
U ′′i+1,j
U ′′i,j+1
U ′′i+1,j+1
Ui,j X XZ Ui,j+1 Z I
Ui+1,j XZ X Ui+1,j+1 X X
(b)
Figure 4: Example of Quantum one-time pad. (a) The red
Pauli gates apply the QOTP. (b) The green gates undo the
QOTP coming from previous bands.
Overall, replacing each gate Ui,j with U
′′
i,j yields a new
circuit that is equivalent to the the original one, apart
from the un-recovered QOTP ⊗ni=1Xα
′
i,mZαi,m in the last
band. Since all measurements are in the Pauli-X basis,
the Pauli-X component of this un-recovered QOTP is
irrelevant, while its Pauli-Z component bit-flips some of
the outputs. These bit-flips can be undone by replacing
each output si with si ⊕ αi,m (a procedure that we call
“classical post-processing of the outputs”). This allows
to recover the correct outputs.
After all the circuits have been implemented and the
outputs have been post-processed, the flag bit is initial-
ized to |acc〉 = |0〉, then it is checked whether all the
traps gave the correct output s = 0. If they do, the pro-
tocol returns the output of the target together with the
bit |acc〉, otherwise it returns the output of the target to-
gether with the bit |rej〉 = |1〉. The output of the target
is only accepted in the first case, while it is discarded in
the second case.
In the absence of noise, our protocol always returns the
correct output of the target circuit and always accepts it.
Correctness of the target is ensured by the fact that the
QOTP has no effect on the computation, as all the extra
Pauli gates cancel out with each other or are countered by
the classical post-processing of the outputs. Acceptance
is ensured by the fact that in the absence of noise all the
trap circuits always yield the correct outcome s = 0.
We will now consider a noisy implementation of
our protocol, explain the role played by the various
tools (QOTP, trap circuits etc.) and show that with
single-qubit gates suffering bounded noise, our protocol
ensures that wrong outputs are rejected with high
probability.
4. The credibility of our protocol: As per Equation
2, we model noise as a set of CPTP maps acting on the
whole system and on the environment (Figure 5). For
simplicity, let us begin with the assumption that all the
rounds of single-qubit gates in our protocol are noiseless,
i.e. that for all circuits k = 1, . . . , v + 1 and bands j =
1, . . . ,m, a noisy implementation of the round of single-
qubit gates is (cfr. Figure 5 for notation)
U˜ ′′(k)j = E (k)j
(U ′′(k)j ⊗ IE) with E (k)j = ISE , (11)
where ISE is the identity on system and environment.
Under this assumption, a first simplification to the noise
of type N1 comes from the QOTP, a tool used in many
works in verification [25] and benchmarking protocols
[20, 51] that also plays a crucial role in our protocol.
If single-qubit gates are noiseless, the QOTP allows to
randomize all noise processes, even those non-local in
space and time, to classically correlated Pauli errors (see
Lemma 1 in Appendix A). A similar result was previ-
ously proven in Ref. [51] for Markovian noise, and here
we show that this result holds also if the noise creates
correlations in time.
Having reduced arbitrary non-local noise to Pauli er-
rors via the QOTP, we show (see Lemma 2 in Appendix
6⊗ni=1|+〉i〈+|
⊗ni=1|+〉i〈+|
ρE
R(1)
U ′′(1)1
E (1)1
CZ1
F (1)1
U ′′(1)m
E (1)m M(1)
X
R(2)
U ′′(2)1
E (2)1
CZ1
F (2)1
Figure 5: Schematic illustration of a noisy implementation of our protocol where all boxes represent CPTP maps. U ′′(k)j
implements the round of single-qubit gates in band j of circuit k, CZj implements the round of cZ gates in band j. In each
circuit k = 1, . . . , v+1: R(k) is the noise in state preparation,M(k) is the noise in measurements, E (k)j is the noise in the round
of single-qubit gates in band j and F (k)j is the noise in the round of cZ gates in band j.
B) that our trap circuits detect all Pauli errors with non-
zero probability. The reasoning is as follows: Since the
trap circuits contain only Clifford gates, the noise acting
at any point of a trap circuit can be factored to the end
of the circuit. The noisy trap circuit is thus rewritten
as the original one (Figure 3a) with a Pauli-Z error P ∈
{I, Z}⊗n applied before the measurements. If P 6= I⊗n,
the trap outputs a wrong output (s 6= 0) and the noise
is detected. However, if the errors in different parts of
the circuit happen to cancel out, then P = I⊗n, the trap
outputs s = 0 and the noise is not detected. The role
of H and S-gates in our trap circuits is to ensure that
this happens with suitably low probability for all types
of noise that can possibly affect the trap. These gates
map Pauli errors into other Pauli errors as
→ H S
X → Z Y
Y → Y X
Z → X Z (12)
where we omit unimportant prefactors (global phases do
not affect outputs). Therefore, the random implementa-
tion of H and S-gates prevents errors in state preparation
and two-qubit gates from canceling trivially. Similarly,
the rounds of Hadamard gates activated at random at
the beginning and at the end of the trap circuits prevent
measurement errors from canceling trivially with noise
happening before. These arguments are used to prove
the claim of Lemma 2, that states that our trap circuits
can detect all possible Pauli errors with probability larger
than 1/4.
The above arguments and Lemmas can be used to
prove that our protocol can detect arbitrary noise in state
preparation, measurement and two-qubit gates, provided
that single-qubit gates are noiseless:
Theorem 1. Suppose that all single-qubit gates in our
accreditation protocol are noiseless. For any number v ≥
3 of trap circuits, our accreditation protocol can accredit
the outputs of a noisy quantum computer affected by noise
of the form N1 with
ε =
κ
v + 1
, (13)
where κ = 3(3/4)2 ≈ 1.7.
To prove ε = κ/(v + 1) we write the state of the system
at the end of a noisy protocol run as in Equation 3. We
do this using Lemmas 1 and 2. The proof of Theorem 1
is in Appendix C.
We now relax the assumption of noiseless single-qubit
gates and generalize our results to noise of the form N2.
We assume that all rounds of single-qubit gates suffer
bounded noise, i.e. that for all circuits k = 1, . . . , v + 1
and bands j = 1, . . . ,m, a noisy implementation of the
round of single-qubit gates is (cfr. Figure 5 for notation)
U˜ ′′(k)j = E (k)j
(U ′′(k)j ⊗ IE) with ||E (k)j − ISE || ≤ r(k)j
(14)
and with 0 ≤ r(k)j < 1. We refer to this number r(k)j
as “error rate” of U ′′(k)j . Since each U ′′(k)j is chosen at
random (depending on whether circuit k is the target or
a trap and on the QOTP) and since noise in single-qubit
gates is potentially gate-dependent (condition N2), let us
indicate with r
(k)
max, j the maximum error rate of single-
qubit gates in band j of circuit k, the maximum being
taken over all possible choices of U ′′(k)j .
We can now state Theorem 2:
Theorem 2. Our protocol with v ≥ 3 of trap circuits
can accredit the outputs of a noisy quantum computer
affected by noise of the form N1 and N2 with
ε = g
κ
v + 1
+ 1 − g , (15)
where κ = 3(3/4)2 ≈ 1.7 and g = ∏j,k(1− r(k)max, j).
To calculate ε for the protocol with noisy single-qubit
gates we use that E (k)j = (1− r(k)max, j)ISE + r(k)max, jQ(k)j ,
where Q(k)j is an arbitrary CPTP map encompassing the
system and the environment. We can then rewrite the
state of the system at the end of the protocol as
ρ?out =gρout +
(
1− g)ρ˜out (16)
where ρout is the state of the system at the end of a
protocol run with noiseless single-qubit gates—which by
Theorem 1 is of the form of Equation 3 with b ≤ κ/(v +
1)—and ρ˜out is a quantum state containing the effects of
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Figure 6: (a) Six-qubit example of circuit in normal form. This circuit has the same repetitive structure as the Brickwork
States [52]. Recompiling the target circuit into a normal form of this type can always be done using the circuit identities (b)
and (c).
noise in single-qubit gates. Expressing ρ˜out as
ρ˜out = h τ˜
tar
1 ⊗|acc〉〈acc|+(1−h) τ˜ tar2 ⊗|rej〉〈rej| , (17)
where τ˜ tar1 and τ˜
tar
2 are arbitrary states for the target
and 0 ≤ h ≤ 1, we thus have
ρ?out=g
[
b τ ′ tarout ⊗ |acc〉〈acc|+ (1− b)
(
l σ tarout ⊗ |acc〉〈acc|
+(1− l)τ tarout ⊗ |rej〉〈rej|
)]
+ (1− g)
[
h τ˜ tar1 ⊗ |acc〉〈acc|
+ (1− h) τ˜ tar2 ⊗ |rej〉〈rej|
]
(18)
As it can be seen, the probability that the target is in
the wrong state and the flag bit is in the state |acc〉 is
gb + (1 − g)h ≤ gκ/(v + 1) + (1 − g)h, where we used
that b ≤ κ/(v + 1) from Theorem 1. This probability
reaches its maximum for h = 1, therefore we have ε =
gk/(v + 1) + 1− g.
If r
(k)
max, j approaches zero for all k, j, then g approaches
unity and ε in Theorem 2 approaches ε in Theorem 1.
This shows that if single-qubit gates suffer low noise, the
credibility of our protocol (quantified by 1−ε) is close to
the credibility of our protocol with noiseless single-qubit
gates.
It is worth noting that our Theorem 1 also holds if
single-qubit gates suffer unbounded noise, provided that
this noise is gate-independent. Indeed, if E (k)j = E does
not depend on the parameters in U ′′(k)j (cfr. Figure 5
for notation), using E (k)j CZjF (k)j = CZjF ′ (k)j (with
F ′ (k)j = CZ−1j E (k)j CZjF (k)j ) we can factor this noise
into that of CZj and prove ε = κ/(v + 1) with the same
arguments used in Theorem 1. Similarly, our Theorem
2 also holds if noise in single-qubit gates has a weak
gate-dependence. This weak gate-dependence of the
noise is one of the assumption required by protocols
centered around randomized benchmarking [16–21].
5. Mesothetic verification protocol: In Box 4 in
the Methods we translate our accreditation protocol into
a cryptographic protocol, obtaining what we call “meso-
thetic” verification protocol. To verify an n-qubit com-
putation, in the mesothetic protocol the verifier (Alice)
must possess a device that can receive n qubits from the
prover (Bob), implement single-qubit gates on all of them
and send the qubits back to the Bob. In Appendix D we
present Theorems D1 and D2, which are the counterparts
of Theorems 1 and 2 for the cryptographic protocol. In
the first two Theorems the number ε is replaced by the
soundness εcr (cfr Definition 4 in Appendix D), namely
the probability that Alice accepts a wrong output for the
target when Bob is cheating.
Our mesothetic verification protocol is different from
prepare-and-send [26–33] or receive-and-measure [34–38]
cryptographic protocols in that Alice encrypts the com-
putation through the QOTP during the actual imple-
mentation of the circuits, and not before or after the
implementation. To do this, she must possess an n-qubit
quantum memory and be able to execute single-qubit
gates. Despite being scalable, our protocol is more de-
manding that those in Ref. [27–38], where Alice only
requires a single-qubit memory. This suggests the in-
teresting possibility that protocols optimized for experi-
ments may translate into more demanding cryptographic
protocols and vice-versa.
Similarly to post-hoc verification protocols [35, 43], our
protocol is not blind. Alice leaks crucial information to
Bob regarding the target circuit, such as the position of
two-qubit gates. This is not a concern for our goals, as
verifiability in our protocol relies on Bob being incapable
to distinguish between target and trap circuits, i.e. to
retrieve the number v0, see Lemma D3 in Appendix D.
Blindness may be required to protect user’s privacy in
future scenarios of delegated quantum computing [53].
In Appendix D we thus show how to make our protocol
blind. This requires recompiling the target circuit into
a circuit in normal form with fixed cZ gates, such as
the brickwork-type circuit in Figure 6. This yields an
increase in circuit depth, hence the minimal overheads of
our protocol must be traded for blindness.
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Figure 7: RHS of Inequality 20 for (a) target circuit preparing and measuring n-qubit GHZ states, with n = m = 7 (dashed
lines) and n = m = 10 (solid lines) and (b) target circuit implementing a pseudo-random circuit for supremacy experiment
[14] with n = 62 qubits and circuit depth m = 34. In these plots we assume that all operations are affected by noise that is
bounded in diamond norm. We also assume that single-qubit state preparation, single-qubit measurements and cZ-gates have
error rates r0, and that all single-qubit gates have error rates r0/10.
DISCUSSION
We have presented a trap-based accreditation protocol
for the outputs of NISQ devices. Our protocol is scalable
and practical, and relies on minimal assumptions on the
noise. Specifically, our protocol requires that single-qubit
gates suffer bounded (but potentially gate-dependent and
non-local in space and time) noise.
A single protocol run ends by either accepting or re-
jecting the output of the target circuit that we seek to
accredit. We can then run our accreditation protocol
multiple times (with the same target and with the same
number of traps), each time keeping the output if the
protocol accepts and discarding it if the protocol rejects.
After multiple runs with i.i.d. noise, our protocol al-
lows to bound the variation distance between noisy and
noiseless probability distribution of the accepted outputs
(Equation 1).
Real-world devices can be accredited by running our
protocol on them. The accreditation is provided by
bounds on the variation distance that rely on ε, which
we obtained in Theorems 1 and 2, and the acceptance
probability prob(acc) of our accreditation protocol. The
latter is estimated experimentally by running our proto-
col multiple times on the device being accredited.
Some noise models allow to lower-bound the accep-
tance probability analytically and consequently to upper-
bound the variation distance. For instance, if all opera-
tions E (p)S in our protocol suffer bounded noise and have
error rates rp, we can write the state of the system at the
end of the protocol as
ρout = δ σ
tar
out ⊗ |acc〉〈acc|+ (1− δ)τ˜ , (19)
where σtarout is the state of the target at the end of a noise-
less protocol run, τ˜ is an arbitrary state for target and
flag and δ =
∏
p(1−rp) ∈ [0, 1]. This yields prob(acc)≥ δ
and (cfr. Equation 5)
1
2
∑
s
∣∣pnoiseless(s)− pnoisy(s)∣∣ ≤ ε
prob(acc)
≤ ε
δ
(20)
In Figure 7 we plot the RHS of the above equation. Plots
of this type can be used to seek error rates that will pro-
vide the desired upper-bound on the variation distance.
Considering the error rates of present NISQ devices
[2, 45–48] we expect that our protocol may provide worth-
while upper-bounds for target circuits with up to n ≈ 7
qubits and m ≈ 7 bands (Figure 7a). We also expect
that larger target circuits may yield upper-bounds that
are too large to be useful. In fact, for large target cir-
cuits, it is also possible that none of the protocol runs
will accept the output of the target, and thus that our
protocol will provide no upper-bound. Nevertheless, it is
worth remarking that this does not indicate that our ac-
creditation protocol is unable to accredit computations
on NISQ devices. On the contrary, by providing large
upper-bounds, our protocol reveals that the device being
tested suffers high levels of noise and that its outputs are
not credible.
Our work leaves several open questions. Our Theo-
rem 2 shows that our protocol requires reducing the error
rates of single-qubit gates with the size of the target cir-
cuit. This requirement is similar to that found in other
works [29, 38, 41], and is a known obstacle towards scal-
able quantum computing. A strategy that has been ex-
ploited in previous works is to incorporate fault-tolerance
into the existing protocols [29, 41, 54].
9Another open question regards the applicability of
our accreditation protocol if single-qubit gates suffer un-
bounded noise. In its current state, the analysis of our
protocol does not account for unbounded gate-dependent
noise in single-qubit gates, including unitary errors such
as over- or under-rotations. The reason is that the QOTP
(which maps coherent errors into classically correlated
Pauli errors) is applied at the level of single-qubit gates.
Unbounded errors that depend on the gates used to ran-
domize arbitrary noise processes to Pauli errors are an
obstacle to other works including cryptographic proto-
cols [29] and protocols based on randomized benchmark-
ing [16–21].
Finally, with the mesothetic protocol we show how to
adapt our protocol to the cryptographic setting. In the
mesothetic protocol the verifier requires an n-qubit mem-
ory and the ability to execute single-qubit gates. This
protocol is more demanding than several existing cryp-
tographic protocols [27–38] requiring single-qubit mem-
ory for the verifier. An interesting question is whether
a mesothetic protocol can be devised that only requires
single-qubit gates and single-qubit memory for the veri-
fier.
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METHODS
Overhead of our accreditation protocol: Here we
count the overhead of our protocol. Our protocol has no
quantum overhead, as all circuits have the same size as
the one being verified. The classical overhead consists
in O(nm) bits for each of the v + 1 computations.
Specifically, the target computation has an overhead of
2nm + n bits (the 2nm random bits αi,j , α
′
i,j and the n
random bits γi in Routine 1), while the traps have an
overhead of at most 2nm + n + nm bits (the 2nm + n
random bits in Routine 1 and at most nm random bits
in Routine 2).
Box 1. Accreditation Protocol.
Input:
1. A target circuit that takes as input n qubits in the state |+〉,
contains only single-qubit gates and cZ gates arranged in m
bands and ends with Pauli-X measurements (Figure 2).
2. The number v of trap circuits.
Routine:
1. Choose a random number v0 ∈ {1, . . . , v + 1} and define
{U(v0)i,j } = {Ui,j}, where {Ui,j} is the set of single-qubit gates in
the target circuit.
2. For k = 1, . . . , v + 1: If k 6= v0 (trap circuit), run Routine 2
and obtain the set of single-qubit gates {U(k)i,j } for the k-th trap
circuit.
3. For k = 1, . . . , v + 1: Run Routine 1 and obtain {U ′′(k)i,j },
together with the bit-string (α
(k)
1,m, . . . α
(k)
n,m).
4. For k = 1, . . . , v + 1:
4.1 Create a state ρin = |+〉⊗n.
4.2 Implement circuit k with single-qubit gates from the set
{U ′′(k)i,j } and obtain output s(k) = (s(k)1 , . . . , s(k)n ). Next,
for all i = 1, . . . , n, recompute s
(k)
i as s
(k)
i ⊕ α(k)i,m.
5. Initialize a flag bit to |acc〉 = |0〉. Then, for k = 1, . . . , v + 1:
if s(k) 6= 0 and k 6= v0 (trap circuit), set the flag bit to
|rej〉 = |acc⊕ 1〉.
Output:
The output s(v0) of the target circuit and the flag bit.
Box 2. Routine 1. [Quantum One-Time Pad].
Input:
A set {Ui,j} of single-qubit gates, for j = 1, . . . ,m and
i = 1, . . . , n.
Routine:
1. For j = 1, . . . ,m and i = 1, . . . , n:
Choose two random bits αi,j and α
′
i,j . Next, define
U ′i,j = X
α′i,jZαi,jUi,j .
2. For i = 1, . . . , n:
Choose a random bit γi and define U
′′
i,1 = U
′
i,1X
γi .
3. For j = 1, . . . ,m− 1:
Using Equations 7 and 8 define U ′′i,j+1 so that(⊗i U ′′i,j+1)ĉZj(⊗i U ′i,j) = (⊗i U ′i,j+1)ĉZj(⊗i Ui,j) (21)
where ĉZj is the entangling operation in the jth band.
Output:
The set {U ′′i,j} and the n-bit string (α1,m, . . . , αn,m).
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Box 3. Routine 2. [Single-qubit gates for trap circuits].
Input:
The target circuit.
Routine:
1. Initialize the set {Ui,j = Ii}, for i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . ,m.
2. For all j = 1, . . . ,m− 1:
2.1 For all i = 1, . . . , n: If in band j of the target circuit qubits i and i′ are connected by a cZ gate, set
• Ui,j = SiUi,j and Ui′,j = Hi′Ui′,j with probability 1/2.
• Ui,j = HiUi,j and Ui′,j = Si′Ui′,j with probability 1/2.
Otherwise, set Ui,j = SiUi,j or Ui,j = HiUi,j with probability 1/2.
2.2 For all i = 1, . . . , n: Set Ui,j+1 = U
†
i,j .
3. For all i = 1, . . . , n:
Choose a random bit t ∈ {0, 1}. Next, set Ui,1 = Ui,1Ht and Ui,m = HtUi,m.
Output:
The set {Ui,j}.
Box 4: Mesothetic Protocol (further details in Appendix D)
Input:
A classical description of the target circuit and the number v of traps. (The input is known to both Alice and Bob).
Preliminary Operations:
1. Alice randomly chooses which circuit v0 ∈ {1, . . . , v + 1} will be used to implement the target. Next she defines
{U (v0)i,j } = {Ui,j}, where {Ui,j} is the set of single-qubit gates in the target circuit.
2. For k = 1, . . . , v + 1: If k 6= v0 (trap circuit), Alice runs Routine 2 and obtains the set {U (k)i,j } of single-qubit gates for the
k-th circuit.
3. For k = 1, . . . , v + 1: Alice runs Routine 1 and obtains the set of gates {U ′′(k)i,j }, together with the random bits α(k)i,m.
Routine:
4. For all k = 1, . . . , v + 1, Alice and Bob interact as follows:
4.1 Bob creates n qubits in state |+〉.
4.2 For j = 1, . . . ,m:
4.2.1 Bob sends all the qubits to Alice. For i = 1, . . . , n, Alice executes U
′′(k)
i,j on qubit i. Finally, Alice sends all the
qubits back to Bob.
4.2.2 Bob applies the entangling gates ĉZj contained in the j-th band of the target circuit.
4.3 For i = 1, . . . , n: Bob measures qubit i in the Pauli-X basis and communicates the output to Alice. Alice bit-flips the
output if α
(k)
i,m = 1, otherwise she does nothing. Next, if k 6= v0 and this output is si = 1, Alice aborts the protocol,
otherwise she does nothing.
5. Alice initializes a flag bit to the state |acc〉 = |0〉. Next, for all k = 1, . . . , v + 1: if k 6= v0 (trap circuit) and s(k)i ⊕ α(k)i,m 6= 0
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Alice sets the flag bit to |rej〉 = |acc⊕ 1〉.
Output:
The outputs of the target circuit and the flag bit.
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Notation: In these Appendices we will indicate the action of the round of single-qubit gates in a band j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
of a circuit k ∈ {1, . . . , v + 1} as U ′′(k)j (ρS) = ⊗ni=1U ′′(k)i,j (ρS)U†′′(k)i,j , where ρS is the state of the system. Similarly,
we will indicate the action of a round of cZ gates on the system as CZj(ρS) = ĉZj(ρS)ĉZj , where ĉZj is the tensor
product of all cZ gates in band j in the target circuit, and the action of n-qubit Pauli operators as P ∈ {I ,X ,Y ,Z}⊗n,
where I(ρ) = ρ, X (ρ) = XρX, Y(ρ) = Y ρY , Z(ρ) = ZρZ are single-qubit Pauli operators.
In Appendix A we provide statement and proof of Lemma 1, In Appendix B we provide statement and proof of
Lemma 2 , In Appendix C we prove Theorem 1 and in Appendix D we prove soundness of the mesothetic protocol.
Appendix A: Statement and Proof of Lemma 1
We now present and prove Lemma 1, which is as follows:
Lemma 1. Suppose that all single-qubit gates in all the circuits implemented in our protocol are noiseless, and that
state preparation, measurements and two-qubit gates suffer noise of the type type N1. For a fixed choice of single-qubit
gates U (1)1 , . . . ,U (v+1)m , summed over all the random bits αi,j , α′i,j , γi (cfr. Routine 1), the joint state of the target
circuit and of the traps after they have all been implemented is of the form
ρout
(U (1)1 , . . .,U (v+1)m ) = ∑
s(1),...,s(v+1)
∑
P(1)1 ,...,P(v+1)m
prob
(P (1)1 , . . . ,P (v+1)m )
2n(v+1)
×
v+1⊗
k=1
〈+|⊗n
[
Zs(k)P (k)m U (k)m ◦m−1j=1
(
CZjP (k)j U (k)j
)
◦ P (k)0
(
ρin
)]|+〉⊗n(⊗i Zs(k)ii |+〉i〈+|Zs(k)ii ) (A1)
where ρin = ⊗i|+〉i〈+|, s(k) = (s(k)1 , . . . , s(k)n ) is a binary string representing the output of the k-th circuit, Zs
(k)
(ρ) =
⊗iZs
(k)
i
i ρZ
s
(k)
i
i and prob
(P (1)1 , . . . ,P (v+1)m ) is the joint probability of a collection of Pauli errors P (1)1 , . . . ,P (v+1)m af-
fecting the system, with P (k)1 , . . . ,P (k)m−1 ∈ {I ,X ,Y ,Z}⊗n and P (k)0 ,P (k)m ∈ {I,Z}⊗n for all k.
This Lemma shows that if single-qubit gates are noiseless, the QOTP allows to reduce noise of the type N1 to
classically correlated Pauli errors. These Pauli errors affect each circuit after state preparation (P (k)0 ), before each
entangling operation CZj (P (k)j , for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}) and before the measurements (P (k)m ). Errors in the cZ gates
can be Pauli-X, Y and Z, while those in state preparation and measurements are Pauli-Z (this is because their
Pauli-X components stabilize ρin and Pauli-X measurements respectively).
The main tool used in this section is the “Pauli Twirl” [18].
[Pauli Twirl]. Let ρ be a 2n×2n density matrix and let P, P ′ be two n-fold tensor products of the set of Pauli operators
{I,X, Y, Z}. Denoting by {Qr} the set of all n-fold tensor products of the set of Pauli operators {I,X, Y, Z},
4n∑
r=1
QrPQrρQrP
′Qr = 0 ∀ P 6= P ′. (A2)
We will also use a restricted version of the Pauli Twirl, which is proven in Ref. [29]
[Restricted Pauli Twirl]. Let ρ be a 2n × 2n density matrix and let P, P ′ be two n-fold tensor products of the set
of Pauli operators {I, Z}. Denoting by {Qr} the set of all n-fold tensor products of the set of Pauli operators {I,X},
2n∑
r=1
QrPQrρQrP
′Qr = 0 ∀ P 6= P ′. (A3)
The same holds if P and P ′ are two n-fold tensor products of the set of Pauli operators {I,X} and {Qr} is the set of
all n-fold tensor products of the set of Pauli operators {I, Z}.
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Figure 8: Noisy implementation of the 6-qubit target circuit in Figure 2. The noise in state preparation is described by the
unitary R, that in the measurements by M, that in the cZ-gates in a band j = 1, . . . ,m − 1 by Fj . All these unitaries act
simultaneously on the system and on the environment (initially in the ground state |e0〉).
Proof. (Lemma 1) We start proving the lemma for the case where we run a single circuit (v = 0), and then we
generalize to multiple circuits (v > 0). Including all purifications in the environment, we can rewrite the noise as
unitary matrices acting on system and environment (for clarity we write these unitaries in bold font). Doing this,
for a fixed choice of gates U ′′j , . . . ,U ′′m (which depend on the choice of gates U1, . . . ,Um and on all the random bits
αi,j , α
′
i,j , γi, cfr. Routine 1), the state of the system before the measurement becomes
ρ
(U ′′1 , . . . ,U ′′m) =
TrE
[
M U ′′mĉZm−1Fm−1U
′′
m−1 . . . ĉZ1F1U
′′
1 R
(
ρin ⊗ ρE
)
R† U ′′†1 F
†
1ĉZ1 . . . U
′′†
m−1F
†
m−1ĉZm−1U
′′†
m M
†
]
, (A4)
where ρin = ⊗i|+〉i〈+|, ρE = |e0〉〈e0| is the initial state of the environment, U ′′j = ⊗iU ′′i,j are the gates output by
Routine 1, the unitary matrix R represents the noise in state preparation, the unitary matrix M represents the noise
in the measurements, ĉZjFj is the noisy round of entangling gates in a band j and TrE
[ · ] is the trace over the
environment.
For simplicity, we first prove our result for a circuit with m = 2 bands and generalize to m > 2 bands later. In this
case, defining an orthonormal basis {|ep〉〈ep|} for the environment, the state in Equation A4 is
ρ
(U ′′1 ,U ′′2 ) = ∑
p
〈ep|M U ′′2 ĉZ1F1U ′′1 R
(
ρin ⊗ |e0〉〈e0|
)
R† U ′′†1 F
†
1ĉZ1U
′′†
2 M
†|ep〉 . (A5)
Introducing resolutions of the identity on the environment before and after every noise operator, we have
ρ
(U ′′1 ,U ′′2 ) = ∑
p
k1,k2,l1,l2
[
〈ep|M|ek1〉 U ′′2 ĉZ1〈ek1 |F1|ek2〉U ′′1 〈ek2 |R|e0〉
](
ρin
)[〈e0|R†|el2〉 U ′′†1 〈el2 |F†1|el1〉ĉZjU ′′†2 〈el1 |M†|ep〉] ,
(A6)
since
∑
k |ek〉〈ek| = IE and 〈ek|VS |ek′〉 = VSδk,k′ for every operator VS acting only on the system. The operators
〈ep|M|ek1〉, 〈ek1 |F1|ek2〉, 〈ek2 |R|e0〉, 〈e0|R†|el2〉, 〈el2 |F†1|el1〉, 〈el1 |M†|ep〉 act only on the system, and can thus be
written as in Table 2.
〈ek2 |R|e0〉 =
∑
µ1
η
(R)
k2,0,µ1
Pµ1 〈ek1 |F1|ek2〉 =
∑
µ2
η
(F )
k1,k2,µ2
Pµ2 〈ep|M|ek1〉 =
∑
µ3
η
(M)
p,k1,µ3
Pµ3
〈e0|R†|el2〉 =
∑
ν1
η
∗(R)
l2,0,ν1
Pν1 〈el2 |F†1|el1〉 =
∑
ν2
η
∗(F )
l1,l2,ν2
Pν2 〈el1 |M†|ep〉 =
∑
ν3
η
∗(M)
p,l1,ν3
Pν3
Table 2.
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In Table 2, Pµ ∈ {I,X, Y, Z}⊗n are n-fold tensor products of Pauli operators acting on the system and
η
(R)
k2,0,µ1
, η
(F )
k1,k2,µ2
, η
(M)
kp,k1,µ3
are complex numbers. We then obtain
ρ
(U ′′1 ,U ′′2 ) = ∑
p,k1,k2,l1,l2
µ1,µ2,µ3
ν1,ν2,ν3
(
η
(R)
k2,0,µ1
η
(F )
k1,k2,µ2
η
(M)
p,k1,µ3
η
∗(R)
l2,0,ν1
η
∗(F )
l1,l2,ν2
η
∗(M)
p,l1,ν3
)
Pµ3U
′′
2 ĉZ1Pµ2U
′′
1 Pµ1
(
ρin
)
Pν1U
′′†
1 Pν2 ĉZ1U
′′†
2 Pν3 .
(A7)
We will now describe how to apply the Pauli twirl Lemmas iteratively, in the order the operations apply on the input.
Therefore, we start by showing how to eliminate terms of the sum where µ1 6= ν1. Since X stabilizes |+〉 states, we
can rewrite ρin as
(⊗iXγii )ρin(⊗iXγii ). Moreover, using U ′′1 = U ′1(⊗iXγii ), cfr. Routine 1, the above state becomes
ρ
(U ′′1 ,U ′′2 ) = ∑
p,k1,k2,l1,l2
µ1,µ2,µ3
ν1,ν2,ν3
(
η
(R)
k2,0,µ1
η
(F )
k1,k2,µ2
η
(M)
p,k1,µ3
η
∗(R)
l2,0,ν1
η
∗(F )
l1,l2,ν2
η
∗(M)
p,l1,ν3
)
Pµ3U
′′
2 ĉZ1Pµ2U
′
1
(⊗i Xγii )Pµ1(⊗i Xγii )(ρin)(⊗i Xγii )Pν1(⊗i Xγii )U ′†1 Pν2 ĉZ1U ′′†2 Pν3 . (A8)
Summing over all possible γi and applying the Restricted Pauli Twirl (the Pauli-X components of both Pµ1 and Pν1
stabilize ρin and can thus be ignored), we obtain a factor δµ1,ν1 , and thus the above state becomes
ρ
(U ′1,U ′′2 ) = 12n ∑{γi} ρ
(U ′′1 ,U ′′2 )
=
∑
p,k1,k2,l1,l2
µ1,µ2,µ3
ν2,ν3
(
η
(R)
k2,0,µ1
η
(F )
k1,k2,µ2
η
(M)
p,k1,µ3
η
∗(R)
l2,0,µ1
η
∗(F )
l1,l2,ν2
η
∗(M)
p,l1,ν3
)
Pµ3U
′′
2 ĉZ1Pµ2U
′
1Pµ1
(
ρin
)
Pµ1U
′†
1 Pν2 ĉZ1U
′′†
2 Pν3 .
(A9)
To operate a Pauli twirl on Pµ2 and Pν2 , we rewrite U
′
1 as
(⊗i Zαi,1Xα′1,i)U1 and U ′′2 ĉZ1 as U ′2ĉZ1(⊗i Xα′1,iZαi,1),
cfr. Routine 1. Summing over αi,1 and α
′
i,1 and using the Pauli Twirl, we obtain δµ2,ν2 , and thus
ρ
(U1,U ′2) = 122n ∑{αi,1},{α′i,1} ρ
(U ′1,U ′′2 )
=
∑
p,k1,k2,l1,l2
µ1,µ2,µ3
ν3
(
η
(R)
k2,0,µ1
η
(F )
k1,k2,µ2
η
(M)
p,k1,µ3
η
∗(R)
l2,0,µ1
η
∗(F )
l1,l2,µ2
η
∗(M)
p,l1,ν3
)
Pµ3U
′
2ĉZ1Pµ2U1Pµ1
(
ρin
)
Pµ1U
†
1Pµ2 ĉZ1U
′†
2 Pν3 .
(A10)
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To operate a Pauli twirl on Pµ3 and Pν3 we write the state of the system after the measurements:
ρmeas
(U1,U ′2) = 12n ∑{si}⊗i
(
〈+|iZsii ρ
(U1,U ′2) Zsii |+〉i) Zsii |+〉i〈+|Zsii
=
1
2n
∑
p,k1,k2,l1,l2
µ1,µ2,µ3,ν3
s1,...,sn
(
η
(R)
k2,0,µ1
η
(F )
k1,k2,µ2
η
(M)
p,k1,µ3
η
∗(R)
l2,0,µ1
η
∗(F )
l1,l2,µ2
η
∗(M)
p,l1,ν3
)
×
〈+|⊗n(⊗i Zsii )Pµ3U ′2ĉZ1Pµ2U1Pµ1(ρin)Pµ1U†1Pµ2 ĉZ1U ′†2 Pν3(⊗i Zsii )|+〉⊗n × (⊗i Zsii |+〉i〈+|Zsii )
=
1
2n
∑
p,k1,k2,l1,l2
µ1,µ2,µ3,ν3
s1,...,sn
(
η
(R)
k2,0,µ1
η
(F )
k1,k2,µ2
η
(M)
p,k1,µ3
η
∗(R)
l2,0,µ1
η
∗(F )
l1,l2,µ2
η
∗(M)
p,l1,ν3
)
× 〈+|⊗n(⊗i Zsii )Pµ3(⊗i Xα′i,2i Zαi,2i )U2ĉZ1Pµ2U1Pµ1(ρin)Pµ1U†1Pµ2 ĉZ1U†2(⊗i Xα′i,2i Zαi,2i )Pν3(⊗i Zsii )|+〉⊗n
(
⊗i Zsii |+〉i〈+|Zsii
)
, (A11)
where in the second equality we used U ′2 =
(⊗iXα′i,2i Zαi,2i )U2 . We can now rewrite |+〉⊗n as ⊗iXα′′i,2i |+〉⊗n and sum
over {α′i,2}. Using the Restricted Pauli Twirl (the Pauli-X components of both Pµ3 and Pν3 stabilize |+〉⊗n and can
thus be ignored), we obtain δµ3,ν3 :
ρmeas
(U1,U2) = 12n ∑
α′i,2
ρmeas
(U1,U ′2)
=
1
2n
∑
p,k1,k2,l1,l2
µ1,µ2,µ3,ν3
s1,...,sn
(
η
(R)
k2,0,µ1
η
(F )
k1,k2,µ2
η
(M)
p,k1,µ3
η
∗(R)
l2,0,µ1
η
∗(F )
l1,l2,µ2
η
∗(M)
p,l1,µ3
)
× 〈+|⊗n(⊗i Zsii )Pµ3(⊗i Zαi,2i )U2ĉZ1Pµ2U1Pµ1(ρin)Pµ1U†1Pµ2 ĉZ1U†2(⊗i Zαi,2i )Pµ3(⊗i Zsii )|+〉⊗n
×⊗iZsii |+〉i〈+|Zsii (A12)
Finally, after the classical post-processing (which replaces the outputs si with si ⊕ αi,2), average over {αi,2} yields
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the outcome state
ρout
(U1, U2) = 12n ∑{αi,2}
1
2n
∑
p,k1,k2,l1,l2
µ1,µ2,µ3
s1,...,sn
(
η
(R)
k2,0,µ1
η
(F )
k1,k2,µ2
η
(M)
p,k1,µ3
η
∗(R)
l2,0,µ1
η
∗(F )
l1,l2,µ2
η
∗(M)
p,l1,µ3
)
× 〈+|⊗n(⊗i Zsii )Pµ3(⊗i Zαi,2i )U2ĉZ1Pµ2U1Pµ1(ρin)Pµ1U†1Pµ2 ĉZ1U†2(⊗i Zαi,2i )Pµ3(⊗i Zsii )|+〉⊗n
×⊗iZsi⊕αi,2i |+〉i〈+|Zsi⊕αi,2i
=
1
2n
∑
{αi,2}
1
2n
∑
p,k1,k2,l1,l2
µ1,µ2,µ3
s1,...,sn
(
η
(R)
k2,0,µ1
η
(F )
k1,k2,µ2
η
(M)
p,k1,µ3
η
∗(R)
l2,0,µ1
η
∗(F )
l1,l2,µ2
η
∗(M)
p,l1,µ3
)
× 〈+|⊗n(⊗i Zsi⊕αi,2i )Pµ3(⊗i Zαi,2i )U2ĉZ1Pµ2U1Pµ1(ρin)Pµ1U†1Pµ2 ĉZ1U†2(⊗i Zαi,2i )Pµ3(⊗i Zsi⊕αi,2i )|+〉⊗n
×⊗iZsii |+〉i〈+|Zsii
=
1
2n
∑
µ1,µ2,µ3
s1,...,sn
( ∑
p,k1,k2,l1,l2
η
(R)
k2,0,µ1
η
(F )
k1,k2,µ2
η
(M)
p,k1,µ3
η
∗(R)
l2,0,µ1
η
∗(F )
l1,l2,µ2
η
∗(M)
p,l1,µ3
)
× 〈+|⊗n(⊗i Zsii )Pµ3U2ĉZ1Pµ2U1Pµ1(ρin)Pµ1U†1Pµ2 ĉZ1U†2Pµ3(⊗i Zsii )|+〉⊗n
×⊗iZsii |+〉i〈+|Zsii
=
1
2n
∑
µ1,µ2,µ3
s1,...,sn
φµ1,µ2,µ3 〈+|⊗n
(⊗i Zsii )Pµ3U2ĉZ1Pµ2U1Pµ1(ρin)Pµ1U†1Pµ2 ĉZ1U†2Pµ3(⊗i Zsii )|+〉⊗n
×⊗iZsii |+〉i〈+|Zsii , (A13)
where
φµ1,µ2,µ3 =
∑
p,k1,k2,l1,l2
η
(R)
k2,0,µ1
η
(F )
k1,k2,µ2
η
(M)
p,k1,µ3
η
∗(R)
l2,0,µ1
η
∗(F )
l1,l2,µ2
η
∗(M)
p,l1,µ3
=
∑
p
∣∣∣∣ ∑
k1,k2
η
(R)
k2,0,µ1
η
(F )
k1,k2,µ2
η
(M)
p,k1,µ3
∣∣∣∣2 ≥ 0 (A14)
and
∑
µ1,µ2,µ3
φµ1,µ2,µ3 = 1. ρout
(U1, U2) is therefore a convex combination of quantum states and φµ1,µ2,µ3 can be
seen as the joint probability of Pauli errors Pµ1 , Pµ2 and Pµ3 . We can thus rewrite
ρout
(U1,U2) = ∑
P0,P1,P2
s1,...,sn
prob
(P0,P1,P2)
2n
〈+|⊗n
[
ZsP2 U2 CZ1 P1 U1 P0
(
ρin
)]|+〉⊗n(⊗i Zsii |+〉i〈+|Zsii ) , (A15)
where P0,P2 ∈ {I ,Z}⊗n, P1 ∈ {I , ,X ,Y ,Z}⊗n and prob
(P0,P1,P2) is the joint probability of Pauli errors
P0,P1,P2. This concludes the proof for the protocol with v = 0 and m = 2.
The generalization to a protocol with v = 0 and m > 2 is straightforward. Starting from the state in Equation
A4, one can use the same arguments as for the two-band circuit. To generalize to multiple circuits (v > 0), we start
by noticing that the circuits are implemented in series, hence the noise can only affect one circuit at a time. By the
principle of deferred measurements, we can execute all the measurements at the end of the protocol. Moreover, we
can prepare the input qubits for all the circuits at the beginning of the protocol. Doing this, the state of the system
after all circuits have been implemented becomes
ρ
(U ′′(1)1 , . . . ,U ′′(v+1)m ) =
TrE
[(
M(v+1) U ′′(v+1)m ĉZm−1F
(v+1)
m−1 U
′′(v+1)
m−1 . . . ĉZ1F
(1)
v+1U
′′(v+1)
1 R
(v+1)
)
. . .
(
M(1) U ′′(1)m ĉZm−1F
(1)
m−1U
′′(1)
m−1 . . . ĉZ1F
(1)
1 U
′′(1)
1 R
(1)
)
(
ρin ⊗ ρE
)(
R†(1)U ′′†(1)1 F
†(1)
1 ĉZ1 . . . U
′′†(1)
m−1 F
†(1)
m−1ĉZm−1U
′′†(1)
m M
†(1)
)
. . .
(
R†(v+1)U ′′†(v+1)1 F
†(v+1)
1 ĉZ1 . . . U
′′†(v+1)
m−1 F
†(v+1)
m−1
ĉZm−1U
′′†(v+1)
m M
†(v+1)
)]
(A16)
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where ρin = ⊗v+1k=1⊗ni=1 |+〉(k)i 〈+|, R(k),F(k)j ,M(k) are unitary matrices that act only on the qubits in the k-th circuit
and on the environment (which is the same for all the circuits) and U
′′(k)
j = ⊗iU ′′(k)i,j . Starting from here and using
the same arguments as above, one can finally obtain Equation A1.
Appendix B: Statement and Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 1 shows that in our accreditation protocol the noise of the form N1 can be reduced to classically correlated
collections of Pauli errors affecting the circuits. In this Appendix we prove Lemma 2, which states that all collections
of Pauli errors can be detected with probability larger than 1/4. More formally:
Lemma 2. For any collection of Pauli errors affecting a trap circuit, summing over all possible single-qubit gates
in the trap circuit (i.e. over all possible sets {Ui,j} output by Routine 2), the probability that the trap circuit outputs
s = 0 is at most 3/4.
Proof. For a given collection of Pauli errors {Pj}mj=0 affecting a trap circuit, the state of the trap circuit after the
measurements is of the form
ρtrapout
({Pj}) = 1
M1 × · · · ×Mm−1
∑
U1,··· ,Um
PmUm ◦
(
◦m−1j=1 CZjPjUj
)
◦ P0
(
ρtrapin
)
, (B1)
where ρtrapin = ⊗ni=1|+〉i〈+|, CZj is the entangling operation in band j, P0,Pm ∈ {I ,Z}⊗n, Pj ∈ {I ,X ,Y ,Z}⊗n for
all j = 1, . . . ,m and Mj is the number of choices of Uj . Note that each number Mj depends on the number of qubits
connected by a cZ in band j of the trap circuit, cfr. Routine 2.
In a trap circuit the gate U1 in the first band is of the form U1 = V1Ht, where V1 implements a gate from {H,S}⊗n
(cfr. step 2.1 of Routine 2) and Ht is the round of Hadamard gates activated at random (cfr. step 3 of Routine 2).
Similarly, for all j = 2, . . . ,m− 1, Uj implements a gate belonging to the set {I,HS†, SH}⊗n. These gates undo the
gates in previous band and implement new ones (cfr. step 2.1 Routine 2 and Figure 3), thus we can write them as
Uj = VjV−1j−1—with each Vj implementing a gate from the set {H,S}⊗n. Finally, the gate Um in the last band is of
the form Um = HtV−1m−1, where V−1m−1 implements a gate from {H,S†}⊗n and undoes the gate in band m − 1 (cfr.
step 2.2 of Routine 2). Using this, we obtain
ρtrapout
({Pj}) = 1
2
∑
t=0,1
1
N1 × · · · ×Nm−1
∑
V1,··· ,Vm−1
PmHt ◦
(
◦m−1j=1 V−1j CZjPjVj
)
◦HtP0
(
ρtrapin
)
, (B2)
where Nj is the number of possible choices of Vj .
Using that V−1j CZjVj = CXj is a tensor product of cX gates, the above state can also be rewritten as
ρtrapout
({Pj}) = 1
2
∑
t=0,1
1
N1 × · · · ×Nm−1
∑
V1,··· ,Vm−1
PmHt ◦
(
◦m−1j=1 CXjV−1j PjVj
)
◦HtP0
(
ρtrapin
)
. (B3)
Notice that each CXj carries an implicit dependency on Vj (the orientation of the cX gates depends on Vj , cfr. Figure
3).
The probability that the trap outputs s = 0 is
prob
(
s = 0 | {Pj}
)
= 〈+|⊗nρtrapout
({Pj})|+〉⊗n . (B4)
To upper-bound this probability by 3/4, we first consider “single-band” collections of errors, namely collections {Pj}
such that Pj0 6= I for some j0 ∈ {0, . . . ,m} and Pj = I for all other j 6= j0. For these collections, we prove that the
probability that the output of the trap is the correct one s = 0 is smaller than 1/2:
prob(s = 0 | single-band collection) ≤ 1
2
(B5)
We prove this in Statement 1.
Next, we consider “two-band” collections of errors. We obtain
prob(s = 0 | two-band collection) ≤ 3
4
(B6)
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We prove this in Statement 2. To obtain this bound, we move the two errors towards each other (i.e. we commute
them with all the gates in the middle) and subsequently merge them, rewriting them as a single Pauli operator. The
resulting Pauli operator is the identity I with probability c, or is a different operator with probability 1 − c. In the
former case, the errors have canceled out with each other, while in the latter they have reduced to a single-band error.
Importantly, in Statement 2 we prove that c ≤ 1/2. This yields
prob(s = 0 | two-band collection) = (1− c)prob(s = 0 | single-band collection) + c prob(s = 0 | no error)
≤ 1− c
2
+ c =
1
2
+
c
2
, (B7)
where we used prob(s = 0 | no error) = 1 and prob(s = 0 | single-band collection) ≤ 1/2. Maximizing over c ∈ [0, 1/2],
we find
prob(s = 0 | two-band collection) ≤ max
0≤c≤ 12
(
1
2
+
c
2
)
=
3
4
(B8)
Finally, we generalise to collections affecting more than two bands. For three-band collections, again we move two
of these Pauli operators towards each other and merge them. Doing this, the three-band collection reduces to a
single-band one with probability c ≤ 1/2 or to a two-band one with probability 1− c. Thus, using the above results,
we have
prob(s = 0 | three-band collection) = (1− c)prob(s = 0 | two-band collection) + c prob(s = 0 | single-band collection)
≤ 3(1− c)
4
+
c
2
≤ max
0≤c≤ 12
(
3(1− c)
4
+
c
2
)
=
3
4
(B9)
This argument can be iterated: at any fixed h, if prob(s = 0 | (h−2)-band collection) ≤ 3/4 and
prob(s = 0 | (h−1)-band collection) ≤ 3/4, then it can be easily shown that prob(s = 0 | h-band collection) ≤ 3/4.
We now complete the proof by proving Statement 1 and Statement 2.
Statement 1. Single-band collections are defined as follows:
Pj 6= I for j = j0 ∈ {0, · · · ,m} , Pj = I for all j 6= j0. (B10)
If j0 = 0, using cX|+ +〉 = |+ +〉 and cX|00〉 = |00〉, we have
prob
(
s = 0 | {Pj}
)
=
1
2
∑
t=0,1
〈+|⊗nHt ◦
(
◦mj=1 CXj
)
◦HtP0|+〉⊗n
=〈+|⊗nP0|+〉⊗n = 0 , (B11)
since P0 6= I ∈ {I ,Z}⊗n, and the same happens for Pm 6= I .
If 1 ≤ j0 ≤ m− 1, we have
prob
(
s = 0 | {Pj}
)
=
1
Nj0
∑
Vj0
1
2
∑
t=0,1
〈+|⊗nHtV−1j0 Pj0Vj0Ht|+〉⊗n , (B12)
where we used again that cX|+ +〉 = |+ +〉 and cX|00〉 = |00〉. Notice that 〈+|⊗nP |+〉⊗n = 0 for all Pauli operators
P whose Pauli-Z component is non-trivial, therefore
∑
t〈+|⊗nHtPHt|+〉⊗n/2 ≤ 1/2 for all P ∈ {I ,X ,Y ,Z}⊗n/I .
This yields
prob
(
s = 0 | {Pj}
) ≤ 1
Nj0
∑
Vj0
1
2
≤ 1
2
, (B13)
where we used that V−1j0 Pj0Vj0 is a Pauli operator for any Vj0 , as this Vj0 implements a gate from the set {H,S}⊗n.
Statement 2. Two-band collections are defined as follows:
Pj 6= I for j = j1, j2 ∈ {0, · · · ,m} (with j1 < j2) , Pj = I for all j 6= j1, j2. (B14)
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We can distinguish four classes of two-band collections:
1) Errors in state preparation and entangling gates, i.e. j1 = 0 and 1 ≤ j2 ≤ m− 1.
2) Errors in entangling gates and measurements, i.e. 1 ≤ j1 ≤ m− 1 and j2 = m.
3) Errors in two different entangling gates, i.e. 1 ≤ j1 < j2 ≤ m− 1.
4) Errors in state preparation and measurements, i.e. j1 = 0 and j2 = m.
Errors in class 1 yield s = 0 with probability at most 3/4. To prove this, we start by rewriting this probability as
prob
(
s = 0 | {Pj}
)
=
1
2
∑
t=0,1
1
N1 × · · · ×Nm−1
∑
V1,··· ,Vm−1
〈+|⊗nHt ◦
(
◦m−1j=j2 CXj
)
◦ V−1j2 Pj2Vj2
◦
(
◦j2−1j=1 CXj
)
◦HtP0
(
ρtrapin
)|+〉⊗n
=
1
2
∑
t=0,1
1
N1 × · · · ×Nm−1
∑
V1,··· ,Vj2
〈+|⊗nHtV−1j2 Pj2Vj2 ◦
(
◦j2−1j=1 CXj
)
◦HtP0
(
ρtrapin
)|+〉⊗n ,
(B15)
where we used cX| + +〉 = | + +〉 and cX|00〉 = |00〉. We now start from the case j2 = 1. We then note that (i) if
n = 1 (single-qubit circuit), all P1 ∈ {X ,Y ,Z} and all P0 = Z lead to
prob
(
s = 0 | {Pj}, 1 qubit
)
=
1
2
∑
t=0,1
1
N1
∑
V1∈{H,S}
〈+|HtV−11 P1V1HtP0
(
ρtrapin
)|+〉 ≤ 3
4
, (B16)
and (ii) if n = 2 (two-qubit circuit) and in band 1 the two qubits are connected by cZ, all P1 6= I ∈ {I ,X ,Y ,Z}⊗2
and all P0 6= I ∈ {I ,Z}⊗2 lead to
prob
(
s = 0 | {Pj}, 2 qubits
)
=
1
2
∑
t=0,1
1
N1
∑
V1∈{H⊗S,S⊗H}
〈+|⊗2HtV−11 P1V1HtP0
(
ρtrapin
)|+〉⊗2 ≤ 3
4
. (B17)
The above inequalities for n = 1 and n = 2 can be proven using that H maps {X,Y, Z} into {Z, Y,X} under conju-
gation and S maps {X,Y, Z} into {Y,X,Z} under conjugation (apart from unimportant global phases). Extension
to more than two qubits is as follows: If prob
(
s = 0 | {Pj} , n0 qubits
) ≤ 3/4, then tensoring one more qubit yields
prob
(
s = 0 | {Pj}, n0 + 1 qubits
)
=
1
2
∑
t=0,1
1
N1
∑
V1
(
〈+|⊗n0Ht1,...,n0V−11|1,...,n0P1|1,...,n0V1|1,...,n0Ht1,...,n0P0|1,...,n0
(
ρtrapin
)|+〉⊗n0×
〈+|Htn0+1V−11|n0+1P1|n0+1V1|n0+1Htn0+1P0|n0+1
(
ρtrapin
)|+〉) , (B18)
where Ht1,...,n0 ,V1|1,...,n0 ,P1|1,...,n0 and P0|1,...,n0 are the components of Ht,V1,P1 and P0 acting on qubits {1, . . . , n0}
and Htn0+1,V1|n0+1,P1|n0+1 and P0|n0+1 the components acting on qubit n0 + 1. Using that if Ah, Bh ≥ 0 ∀ h, then∑
hAhBh ≤
∑
hAh
∑
hBh, we obtain
prob
(
s = 0 | {Pj}, n0 + 1 qubits
) ≤
1
2
∑
t=0,1
1
N1
∑
V1
(
〈+|⊗n0Ht1,...,n0V−11|1,...,n0P1|1,...,n0V1|1,...,n0Ht1,...,n0P0|1,...,n0
(
ρtrapin
)|+〉⊗n0)×
1
2
∑
t=0,1
1
N1
∑
V1
(
〈+|Htn0+1V−11|n0+1P1|n0+1V1|n0+1Htn0+1P0|n0+1
(
ρtrapin
)|+〉)
≤ 3
4
× 3
4
≤ 3
4
, (B19)
Tensoring two qubits connected by cZ yields the same bound, and this concludes the proof by induction for j2 = 1. If
j2 ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1} the proof is similar, but the Pauli operator V−1j2 Pj2Vj2 must be commuted with CX1, . . . , CXj2−1
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(where we remember that each CXj depends on Vj). At fixed V1, . . . ,Vj2−1 it can be shown (with the same arguments
as used for j2 = 1, i.e. considering first the cases n = 1 and n = 2 and then generalizing to n > 2) that summations
over Vj2 and t yield an upper-bound of 3/4. The upper-bound on prob
(
s = 0 | {Pj}, n0 + 1 qubits
)
follows by
summing over all possible values of V1, . . . ,Vj2−1.
Errors in class 2 yield s = 0 with probability at most 3/4. This can be proven with the same arguments as for
errors in class 1.
Errors in class 3 yield s = 0 with probability at most 3/4. To see this, consider first the case where the errors affect
neighboring bands (j2 = j1 + 1), which yields
prob
(
s = 0 | {Pj}
)
=
1
2
∑
t=0,1
1
Nj1Nj1+1
∑
Vj1 ,Vj1+1
〈+|⊗nHtV−1j1+1Pj1+1Vj1+1V−1j1 Pj1Vj1Ht|+〉⊗n ≤
3
4
(B20)
As for errors in class 1, this can be shown by proving that the bound holds for the single-qubit case and the two-qubit
one, and then using induction. If the errors affect two non-neighboring bands (j2 6= j1 + 1), we have
prob
(
s = 0 | {Pj}
)
=
1
2
∑
t=0,1
1
Nj1Nj2
∑
Vj1 ,Vj2
〈+|⊗nHtV−1j2 Pj2Vj2
(
◦j2−1j=j1+1 CXj
)
V−1j1 Pj1Vj1Ht|+〉⊗n ≤
3
4
(B21)
To prove the inequality, one can commute V−1j1 Pj1Vj1 (which is a Pauli operator) with the entangling operation and
use the same arguments as for j2 = j1 + 1.
Finally, errors in class 4 yield
prob
(
s = 0 | {Pj}
)
=
1
2
∑
t=0,1
1
N1 × · · · ×Nm−1
∑
V1,··· ,Vm−1
〈+|⊗nPmHt ◦
(
◦m−1j=1 CXj
)
◦HtP0
(
ρtrapin
)|+〉⊗n ≤ 1
2
(B22)
To see this, consider first the case t = 0, and consider commuting P0 ∈ {I ,Z}⊗n/I with all the gates in the circuit.
Since all these gates are cX gates with random orientation, the identities
cX(Z1 ⊗ I2) = (Z1 ⊗ I2)cX
cX(I1 ⊗ Z2) = (Z1 ⊗ Z2)cX
cX(Z1 ⊗ Z2) = (I1 ⊗ Z2)cX (B23)
ensure that every time time that a Pauli-Z error is commuted with a cX, this error becomes another error, chosen at
random from two possible ones—Figure 9. This can be used to prove that if t = 0, errors in class 4 are detected with
probability larger than 1/2. The same considerations apply to the case t = 1, where the identities
cX(X1 ⊗ I2) = (X1 ⊗X2)cX
cX(I1 ⊗X2) = (I1 ⊗X2)cX
cX(X1 ⊗X2) = (X1 ⊗ I2)cX (B24)
must be used instead of identities B23.
|+〉1
|+〉2
Z
or
Z
X
X
0
0
or
0
1
Figure 9: In this example, P0 = P1 = Z1 (red gates) and t = 0. Due to identities B23, commuting P1 with the entangling gate (green
box, cX gate with random orientation) make the two errors cancel out if qubit 1 is the control qubit. On the contrary, if qubit 1 is the
target qubit, the errors do not cancel and cause a bit-flip of output s1. Thus, for t = 0 these errors are detected with probability 1/2. The
same can be proven for t = 1 using identities B24, as well as for all other errors P0,P1.
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 1
We start by using Lemma 1 (Appendix 1), which allows to reduce noise of the type N1 to classically correlated
single-qubit Pauli errors and to write the joint state of target and trap circuits after all circuits have been implemented
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(for a fixed choice of single-qubit gates U (k)j ) as
ρout
(U (1)1 , . . . ,U (v+1)m ) = ∑
s(1),...,s(v+1)
∑
P(1)1 ,...,P(v+1)m
prob
(P (1)1 , . . . ,P (v+1)m )
2n(v+1)
×
v+1⊗
k=1
〈+|⊗n
[
Zs(k)P (k)m U (k)m ◦m−1j=1
(
CZjP (k)j U (k)j
)
◦ P (k)0
(
ρin
)]|+〉⊗n(⊗i Zs(k)ii |+〉i〈+|Zs(k)ii ) (C1)
where ρin = ⊗i|+〉i〈+|, s(k) = (s(k)1 , . . . , s(k)n ) is the output of the k-th circuit, Zs
(k)
(ρ) = ⊗iZs
(k)
i
i ρZ
s
(k)
i
i , and
prob
(P (1)1 , . . . ,P (v+1)m ) is the joint probability of a collection of Pauli errors {P (1)1 , . . . ,P (v+1)m } affecting the sys-
tem, with P (k)1 , . . . ,P (k)m−1 ∈ {I ,X ,Y ,Z}⊗n and P (k)0 ,P (k)m ∈ {I,Z}⊗n for all k. Summing over all possible choices
of single-qubit gates we thus obtain the state of target and traps at the end of the protocol:
ρout =
∑
U(1)1 ,...,U(v+1)m
prob
(U (1)1 , . . . ,U (v+1)m ) ρout(U (1)1 , . . . ,U (v+1)m )
=
∑
U(1)1 ,...,U(v+1)m
prob
(U (1)1 , . . . ,U (v+1)m ) ∑
s(1),...,s(v+1)
∑
P(1)1 ,...,P(v+1)m
prob
(P (1)1 , . . . ,P (v+1)m )
2n(v+1)
×
v+1⊗
k=1
〈+|⊗n
[
Zs(k)P (k)m U (k)m ◦m−1j=1
(
CZjP (k)j U (k)j
)
◦ P (k)0
(
ρin
)]|+〉⊗n(⊗i Zs(k)ii |+〉i〈+|Zs(k)ii ) , (C2)
where prob
(U (1)1 , . . . ,U (v+1)m ) is the probability of single-qubit gates U (1)1 , . . . ,U (v+1)m being chosen. Crucially, notice
that the probability associated to each collection of Pauli errors does not depend on the specific choice of single-qubit
gates U (k)j . We can thus rewrite the above state as
ρout =
∑
s(1),...,s(v+1)
∑
P(1)1 ,...,P(v+1)m
prob
(P (1)1 , . . . ,P (v+1)m )
2n(v+1)
∑
U(1)1 ,...,U(v+1)m
prob
(U (1)1 , . . . ,U (v+1)m ) ×
v+1⊗
k=1
〈+|⊗n
[
Zs(k)P (k)m U (k)m ◦m−1j=1
(
CZjP (k)j U (k)j
)
◦ P (k)0
(
ρin
)]|+〉⊗n(⊗i Zs(k)ii |+〉i〈+|Zs(k)ii ) (C3)
Consider now the state
ρout
(P (1)1 , . . . ,P (v+1)m ) = ∑
s(1),...,s(v+1)
1
2n(v+1)
∑
U(1)1 ,...,U(v+1)m
prob
(U (1)1 , . . . ,U (v+1)m )×
v+1⊗
k=1
〈+|⊗n
[
Zs(k)P (k)m U (k)m ◦m−1j=1
(
CZjP (k)j U (k)j
)
◦ P (k)0
(
ρin
)]|+〉⊗n(⊗i Zs(k)ii |+〉i〈+|Zs(k)ii ) (C4)
corresponding to a fixed collection of Pauli errors {P (1)1 , . . . ,P (v+1)m } and assume that the Pauli errors only affect
v̂ ∈ {1, . . . , v + 1} circuits. In this case, as the Pauli errors do not depend on the single-qubit gates, they do not
depend on the random number v0 (which labels the position of the target circuit) nor on the random parameters in
the trap circuits. Therefore, summing over all choices of single-qubit gates, the probability that the target is among
the v̂ circuits affected by noise is v̂/(v + 1).
Next using Lemma 2 (which states that summed over all possible choices of single-qubit gates, trap circuits output
s = 0 with probability at most 3/4) we have that if v̂ − 1 trap circuits are affected by noise, they all output s = 0
with probability at most (3/4)v̂−1. We thus obtain
ρout
(P (1)1 , . . . ,P (v+1)m ) =b˜ τ˜ ′ tarout ⊗ σtraps=0 + (1− b˜)(l˜ σtarout ⊗ σtraps=0 + (1− l˜) τ˜ tarout ⊗ σtraps6=0) (C5)
where τ˜ ′ tarout (σ
tar
out) is the state of the target circuit if the target computation is (is not) among the v̂ traps affected by
noise, τ˜ tarout is an arbitrary state for the target, σ
trap
s=0
is the state of the traps when they all output s = 0, σtrap
s6=0 is an
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arbitrary state for the traps orthogonal to σtrap
s=0
, 0 ≤ l˜ ≤ 1 and
b˜ ≤ v̂
v + 1
(
3
4
)v̂−1
(C6)
For all v ≥ 3 the RHS of the above upper-bound on b˜ is maximized by v̂ = 3, which yields
b˜ ≤ max
v̂
v̂
v + 1
(
3
4
)v̂−1
=
3
v + 1
(
3
4
)2
=
κ
v + 1
, with κ ≈ 1.7
v + 1
(C7)
As this is true for all collections of Pauli errors {P (1)1 , . . . ,P (v+1)m }, we can sum over all possible collections (weighted
by their respective probabilities) and obtain
ρout =
∑
P(1)1 ,...,P(v+1)m
prob
(P (1)1 , . . . ,P (v+1)m ) ρout(P (1)1 , . . . ,P (v+1)m )
= b τ ′ tarout ⊗ σtraps=0 + (1− b)
(
l σtarout ⊗ σtraps=0 + (1− l) τ tarout ⊗ σ
trap
s6=0
)
(C8)
with b ≤ κ/(v + 1) and 0 ≤ l ≤ 1. The Theorem is finally proven by replacing the state of the traps with that of the
flag bit, namely by replacing σtrap
s=0
with |acc〉 and σtrap
s6=0 with |rej〉.
Appendix D: Mesothetic Verification Protocol
Background: We will now define the notions of protocol and verifiability in the cryptographic setting. We start
by defining quantum states as states belonging to the Hilbert space HABC = HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HC , where HA and HB are
Alice’s and Bob’s registers and HC is a common register used to exchange qubits. The definition of protocol is as
follows:
Definition 3. [Protocol] We define a q-step protocol on input ρin ∈ L(HABC) as a series of CPTP maps
{E (p)ABC}qp=1 = {E (p)AC ◦ E (p)BC}qp=1 yielding the state ρout = ◦qp=1E (p)ABC(ρin).
In our protocol Alice verifies the correct implementation of the target circuit through the trap circuits. If Bob is
honest, all these circuits output a default output and the flag bit is set to |acc〉 ∈ {|0〉 , |1〉}, otherwise it is likely that
they return an incorrect output and the flag bit is set to |rej〉 = |acc⊕ 1〉. We thus define verifiability as follows:
Definition 4. [Verifiability] Consider a protocol {E (p)ABC}qp=1 on input ρin. The protocol is “δcr-complete” if
D
(
TrBC
[
◦qp=1 E (p)ABC(ρin)
]
, σtarout ⊗ |acc〉〈acc|
)
≤ 1− δcr , (D1)
where σtarout is the correct state of the target at the end of the protocol, |acc〉 is the state of the state of the traps
indicating acceptance and 0 ≤ δcr ≤ 1 is called “completeness”.
The protocol is “εcr-sound” if for any set of CPTP maps {E˜ (p)BC}qp=1 acting on Bob’s register and on the channel,
the state in Alice’s register at the end of the protocol is
D
(
TrBC
[
◦qp=1
(E (p)ABC ◦ E˜ (p)BC)(ρin)] , l σtarout ⊗ |acc〉〈acc|+ (1− l)τ tarout ⊗ |rej〉〈rej|) ≤ εcr (D2)
where 0 ≤ εcr ≤ 1 is called “soundness”, 0 ≤ l ≤ 1, τ tarout is an arbitrary state and |rej〉 is orthogonal to |acc〉.
We thus model Bob’s deviations as arbitrary CPTP maps acting on the system being processed and on Bob’s
private register.
We can now explain how to translate our protocol in the cryptographic setting.
Mesothetic protocol: We assume that Alice, the verifier, and Bob, the prover, want to implement interactively
a circuit of the type of Figure 2, with n qubits, depth m and single-qubit gates {Ui,j}. We start by defining the
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resources required by Alice:
• Alice’s resources: a device that can receive n qubits from Bob, apply a single-qubit gate to each of them and send
the qubits back to Bob. Alice’s device must be able to execute all single-qubit gates contained in the target circuit,
together with H,S, S† (used in trap circuits) and X,Y, Z (used for the QOTP). We assume that the overall number
of these gates is G.
For the protocol to always accept, Bob must possess a quantum computer that can prepare qubits in the |+〉 state,
execute cZ gates, measure in the Pauli-X basis and store qubits.
We can now explain our protocol, which is formally presented in Box 4 in the Methods. Our protocol takes as input
a description of the target circuit and the number v of trap circuits, both inputs also being known to Bob. Steps 1,
2 and 3 are classical and solely involve Alice’s register, which at the end of step 3 (for a fixed choice of single-qubit
gates U ′′(1)1 , . . . ,U ′′(v+1)m ) is in the state
ρA,in
(U ′′(1)1 , . . . ,U ′′(v+1)m ) =[⊗v+1k=1 ⊗mj=1 ⊗ni=1 |U ′′(k)i,j 〉〈U ′′(k)i,j |]⊗ [⊗v+1k=1 ⊗ni=1|α(k)i,m〉〈α(k)i,m|] (D3)
Here, |U ′′(k)i,j 〉 is a classical description of the gate U ′′(k)i,j . Since Alice’s device can execute G different gates, this
classical description requires at most log2(G) bits. Moreover, |α(k)i,m〉 is a classical description of the bit α(k)i,m.
In step 4 Alice and Bob interact as follows. For all circuits k = 1, . . . , v+ 1, in step 4.1 Bob creates n qubits in the
state |+〉. Then, for each band j = 1, . . . ,m, Bob sends all the qubits to Alice, Alice acts on each qubit i with U (k)i,j ,
Alice sends all the qubits back to Bob and Bob implements ĉZj . Finally, in step 4.3 Bob measures all the qubits and
returns the outputs to Alice. The random but α
(k)
i,m coming from the QOPT in the last round of single-qubit gates
bit-flips the outputs, therefore Bob transmits to Alice the bits s
(k)
i ⊕α(k)i,m. Alice post-processes those bits and obtains
s
(k)
i . At the end of step 4, the states in Alice and Bob’s registers (if Bob is honest) are of the form
ρA,out
(U ′′(1)1 , . . . ,U ′′(v+1)m ) = [⊗v+1k=1 ⊗mj=1 ⊗ni=1 |U ′′(k)i,j 〉〈U ′′(k)i,j |]⊗ [⊗v+1k=1 ⊗ni=1|s(k)i 〉〈s(k)i |]
ρB,out = ⊗v+1k=1 ⊗ni=1 Z
s
(k)
i ⊕α(k)i,m
i |+〉(k)i 〈+|Z
s
(k)
i ⊕α(k)i,m
i (D4)
The protocol ends with Alice checking whether the traps yield the correct output and setting the flag bit to |acc〉 or
|rej〉.
We will now prove completeness and soundness for our mesothetic protocol (we refer the reader to the beginning
of the Appendix for notation). We begin with the assumption that Alice’s device is noiseless. Soundness requires the
following Lemmas:
Lemma D1. Suppose that Alice’s device is noiseless. For a fixed choice of single-qubit gates U (1)1 , . . . ,U (v+1)m by Alice,
tracing out Bob’s private register and summing over all the random bits α
(k)
i,j , α
′(k)
i,j , γ
(k)
i except α
(k)
i,m (cfr. Routine 1),
the state in Bob’s register at the end of the protocol is of the form
ρB,out
(U (1)1 , . . . ,U (v+1)m ) = ∑
s(1),...,s(v+1)
P(1)1 ,...,P(v+1)m
prob
(P (1)1 , . . . ,P (v+1)m )
2n(v+1)
v+1⊗
k=1
〈+|⊗n
[
Zs(k)P (k)m U (k)m ◦m−1j=1
(
CZjP (k)j U (k)j
)
◦ P (k)0
(
ρin
)]|+〉⊗n × (⊗i Zs(k)i ⊕α(k)i,mi |+〉i〈+|Zs(k)i ⊕α(k)i,mi ) ,
(D5)
where ρin = ⊗i|+〉i〈+|, s(k) = (s(k)1 , . . . , s(k)n ) is the output of the k-th circuit, Zs
(k)
(ρ) = ⊗iZs
(k)
i
i ρZ
s
(k)
i
i and
prob
(P (1)1 , . . . ,P (v+1)m ) is the joint probability of a collection of Pauli errors P (1)1 , . . . ,P (v+1)m affecting the system,
with P (k)1 , . . . ,P (k)m−1 ∈ {I ,X ,Y ,Z}⊗n and P (k)0 ,P (k)m ∈ {I ,Z}⊗n for all k.
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Proof. (Sketch). We start proving the Lemma for a protocol with a single circuit (v = 1), next we generalize to
v > 1. For a fixed choice of gates U ′′i,j by Alice, the joint state of Alice’s register A and Bob’s register B before the
final measurements is of the form
ρAB
(U ′′(1)1 , . . . ,U ′′(v+1)m ) = [⊗mj=1 ⊗ni=1|U ′′i,j〉〈U ′′i,j |]⊗ [⊗v+1k=1 ⊗ni=1|αi,m〉〈αi,m|]⊗ (Alice’s register)[
E˜mU ′′m ◦
(
◦m−1j=1 E˜jU ′′j
)
◦ E0
(
ρin
)]
, (Bob’s register) (D6)
where E˜j are Bob’s deviations. Specifically, E˜0 is Bob’s deviation when he prepares ρin (step 4.1), for all j =
1, . . . ,m−1, E˜j is Bob’s deviations when in step 4.2 he should execute ĉZj , E˜m is Bob’s deviation before he measures
the qubits (step 4.3). Without loss of generality, suppose now that Bob holds another register, which we call “ancillary
register” and denote with Banc. Tensoring ρin with the state σanc in the register Banc, for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1} we
can rewrite Bob’s deviations E˜j as unitaries Fj ĉZj , where Fj is a unitary matrix that acts on Bob’s register B and
on Banc—for convenience we indicate unitary matrices acting both on Bob’s register B and on Banc in bold font.
Similarly, we can replace E˜0 with the unitary R and E˜m with the unitary M. We thus obtain
ρABBanc
(U ′′(1)1 , . . . ,U ′′(v+1)m ) = [⊗mj=1 ⊗ni=1|U ′′i,j〉〈U ′′i,j |]⊗ [⊗v+1k=1 ⊗ni=1|αi,m〉〈αi,m|]⊗[
M U ′′mFm−1ĉZm−1U
′′
m−1 . . .F1ĉZ1U
′′
1 R
(
ρin ⊗ σanc
)
R†U ′′†1 ĉZ1F
†
1 . . . U
′′†
m−1ĉZm−1F
†
m−1U
′′†
m M
†
]
(D7)
Tracing out Alice’s register and Banc yields
TrABanc
[
ρABBanc
(U ′′(1)1 , . . . ,U ′′(v+1)m )]
= TrBanc
[
M U ′′mFm−1ĉZm−1U
′′
m−1 . . .F1ĉZ1U
′′
1 R
(
ρin ⊗ σanc
)
R†U ′′†1 ĉZ1F
†
1 . . . U
′′†
m−1ĉZm−1F
†
m−1U
′′†
m M
†
]
(D8)
This state is equal to the state ρ in Equation A4, provided that we replace σanc with ρE and TrBanc with TrE [ · ],
hence the Lemma can be proven repeating the same calculations. The reader can verify that the same applies to the
case v > 1.
Lemma D2. For any collection of Pauli errors affecting a trap circuit, summing over all possible single-qubit gates
in the trap circuit (i.e. over all possible sets {Ui,j} output by Routine 2), the probability that the trap circuit outputs
s = 0 is at most 3/4.
As Alice choses all the gates in a trap circuits with Routine 2, the proof is the same as that of Lemma 2. Using
these two Lemmas we now compute the classical state in Alice’s register after all the circuits have been implemented:
Lemma D3. Suppose that Alice’s device is noiseless. Then, for any number v ≥ 3 of trap computations, the state
in Alice’s register at the end of the protocol is of the form (see Definition 4 for notation)
ρout= b τ
′ tar
out ⊗ |acc〉〈acc|+ (1− b)
(
l σ tarout ⊗ |acc〉〈acc|+ (1− l)τ tarout ⊗ |rej〉〈rej|
)
, (D9)
where τ ′ tarout is an incorrect state for the target, 0 ≤ b ≤ κ/(v + 1) and κ = 3(3/4)2 ≈ 1.7.
Proof. After Bob has implements all the circuits and communicates all the outputs to Alice, Alice holds the same
classical state as Bob (Equation D5). After Alice post-processes the outputs this state becomes (cfr. Lemma D1 for
notation)
ρA,out
(U (1)1 , . . . ,U (v+1)m ) = ∑
s(1),...,s(v+1)
P(1)1 ,...,P(v+1)m
prob
(P (1)1 , . . . ,P (v+1)m )
2n(v+1)
v+1⊗
k=1
〈+|⊗n
[
Zs(k)P (k)m U (k)m ◦m−1j=1
(
CZjP (k)j U (k)j
)
◦ P (k)0
(
ρin
)]|+〉⊗n × (⊗i Zs(k)ii |+〉i〈+|Zs(k)ii ) ,
(D10)
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Crucially, notice that the probability associated to each deviation P (1)1 , . . . ,P (v+1)m does not depend on the choice of
single-qubit gates made by Alice. Thus, summing over all choices of single-qubit gates, this state becomes
ρA,out =
∑
s(1),...,s(v+1)
P(1)1 ,...,P(v+1)m
prob
(P (1)1 , . . . ,P (v+1)m )
2n(v+1)
∑
U(1)1 ,...,U(v+1)m
prob
(U (1)1 , . . . ,U (v+1)m )
v+1⊗
k=1
〈+|⊗n
[
Zs(k)P (k)m U (k)m ◦m−1j=1
(
CZjP (k)j U (k)j
)
◦ P (k)0
(
ρin
)]|+〉⊗n × (⊗i Zs(k)ii |+〉i〈+|Zs(k)ii ) ,
(D11)
The Lemma can now be proven following the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 1.
Using these three Lemmas we can now calculate completeness and soundness for the mesothetic protocol and
obtain Theorem D1:
Theorem D1. Suppose that Alice’s device is noiseless. Then, for any number v ≥ 3 of trap circuits, the mesothetic
protocol is verifiable with
δcr = 1 and εcr =
κ
v + 1
, (D12)
where κ = 3(3/4)2 ≈ 1.7.
Proof. Completeness can be proven trivially showing that for all circuits, the random Pauli gates used for the QOTP
cancel between them, and that the effects of the QOTP in the last band are recovered by the classical post-processing
made by Alice. Therefore, all the circuits implement the desired computation, and a correctly implemented protocol
yields the correct output for the target and the state of the traps indicating acceptance.
To prove soundness we need to compute the trace distance in Equation D2. Using Lemma D3 this trace distance
becomes
D
(
b τ ′ tarout ⊗|acc〉〈acc|+(1−b)
[
l σ tarout⊗|acc〉〈acc|+ (1−l)τ tarout ⊗|rej〉〈rej|
]
, l σtarout⊗|acc〉〈acc|+(1−l)τ tarout⊗|rej〉〈rej|
)
≤ b
(D13)
and since b ≤ κ/(v + 1) by Lemma D3, we obtain soundness εcr = κ/(v + 1).
We can also compute completeness and soundness in the case where Alice’s device suffers bounded and potentially
gate-dependent noise:
Theorem D2. Suppose that Alice’s device is affected by bounded noise, i.e. that for all circuits k ∈ {1, . . . , v + 1}
and bands j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} she applies E (k)j U (k)j , where E (k)j depends on U (k)j , ||E (k)j − I|| ≤ r(k)j and 0 ≤ r(k)j < 1.
Then, for any number v ≥ 3 of trap computations, the mesothetic protocol is verifiable with
δcr = 1 and εcr = g
κ
v + 1
+ 1 − g , (D14)
where κ = 3(3/4)2 ≈ 1.7, g = ∏j,k 1− r(k)max, j and r(k)max, j is the maximum error rate of the round of gates in band j
of circuit k, where this maximum is taken over all choices gates for this round.
Proof. The proof of completeness is the same as for Theorem D1. To compute soundness, we denote as ρ?out the state
in Alice’s register at the end of a protocol run when Alice’s device is noisy, and as ρout the state in Alice’s register at
the end of a protocol run when Alice’s device is noiseless (Lemma D3). Using that ||E (k)j − I|| ≤ r(k)j ≤ r(k)max, j , we
rewrite this noisy map as E (k)j = (1− r(k)max, j)I + r(k)max, jQ(k)j for some other CPTP map Q(k)j . This allows to rewrite
the classical state in Alice’s register at the end of the protocol as gρout + (1− g)ρ?out and to obtain the upper-bound
the trace distance.
We conclude this Appendix by showing how our protocol can be made blind. Blindness is a property exhibited by
many cryptographic protocols [25] defined as follows:
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Definition 5. [Blindness.] A protocol {E (p)ABC} = {E (p)AB ⊗ E (p)BC} on input ρin is blind if for any set of maps {E˜ (p)BC}
acting on Bob’s register and on the channel, the state in Bob’s register at the end of the protocol leaks at most a
constant function of the input.
Typically blind cryptographic protocols leak an upper-bound on the size of the target circuit.
As introduced above, our mesothetic protocol is not blind. Indeed, Bob has access to non-trivial information about
the target circuit, such as the position of cZ gates. This is not a problem for our scopes, as verifiability only relies
on Bob’s ignorance of the number v0, which is kept secret by Alice with the QOTP. Nevertheless, blindness may be
required for maintaining the privacy of the users in future scenarios of delegated computations, thus it is important
to understand whether our protocol can be turned into a blind protocol.
To obtain blindness, Alice (endowed with an ideal device) must recompile the target circuit into a normal form, for
instance by recompiling the target circuit into a circuit of the type illustrated in Figure 6 (which inspired to Brickwork
States [52]). Then, instead of giving as input to the mesothetic protocol a classical description of the target circuit,
she only needs to input the desired size of the circuit in normal form (n qubits, depth m).
Implementing target and traps on a circuit in normal form makes Alice’s instructions to Bob independent from the
specific target circuit that Alice wishes to verify. This allows to prove blindness:
Theorem D3. [Blindness with Circuit in Normal Form]. Suppose that Alice can apply noiseless single-qubit
gates. If Alice rewrites the target circuit in normal form, the mesothetic protocol (with input the desired size of the
circuit in normal form) only leaks an upper-bound on the size of the target circuit.
Proof. To prove blindness we notice that during the protocol run Bob cannot retrieve any information about the
the target circuit. Indeed, Bob’s tasks are the same for all circuits (prepare the same input state, execute the same
entangling gates and measure in the same basis) and these tasks do not depend on the target circuit, since this target
is implemented on a circuit in normal form. Moreover, the only type of information that Bob receives from Alice
during the implementation of the circuits are the qubits at step 4.2.1, but the QOTP prevents Bob from retrieving
useful information: at any k = 1, . . . , v + 1 and j = 1, . . . ,m, if Bob sends to Alice a state ρ
(k)
j , Alice returns to him
the state
U
′′(k)
j ρ
(k)
j U
†′′(k)
j = ⊗ni=1Zα
(k)
i,jXα
′(k)
i,j
[
U
(k)
j Pj−1ρ
(k)
j Pj−1U
†(k)
j
]
Xα
′(k)
i,j Zα
(k)
i,j , (D15)
where Pj−1 is the Pauli operator that undoes previous QOTP. Summing over all possible α
(k)
i,j and α
′(k)
i,j yields the
completely mixed state.
